Attacking software crisis a macro approach. by Zavodny, Joseph E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1985
Security requirements and organization for
non-tactical ADP systems on small surface ships.
Zavodny, Joseph E.





NAVAL PC 3TGRADUATE SCHOOL







SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND ORGANIZATION
FOR NON-TACTICAL ADP SYSTEMS




Thes is Advisor: Barry Frew
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
J22 ol

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Entered)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
I. report numRr 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO
READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
Security Requirements and Organization
For Non-Tactical ADP Systems
On Small Surface Ships
5. TYPE OF REPORT A PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis
September 1985
6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORS S. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*)
Joseph E. Zavodny
I- PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT. TASK
AREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
66




If. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thla Raport)
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol tht abatract entered In Block 20, II dlllatant from Raport)
IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
IS. KEY WOROS ( Continue on rerarae aid* II nacaaaaty and Idantlty by block number,
small surface ships, non-tactical ADP systems, SNAP II,
security requirements, security organization
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on ravataa alda II nacaaaary and Idantlty
This thesis investigates the pro
security requirements and securi
vessels of the US Navy. It pres
at the levels of the Federal gov
and Department of the Navy. The
of whether there is a need for a
non-tactical ADP systems on smal
tail required for such a manual.
by block number)
blem of non-tactical ADP system
ty organizations on small surface
ents an overview of ADP security
ernment , Department of Defense,
author researches the questions
n abbreviated security manual for
1 surface ships the level of de-
and the type of f font i nued) I
DO FORMI JAM 7
J
1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV «5 IS OBSOLETE
S-'N 0102- LF-014-6601
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Mntere,
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS FACE fWhan Dmm Bnfr*4)
ABSTRACT (Continued)
security organization which might be required on a small surface
ship. Conclusions are drawn which present the need for a security
manual which pertains to specific ship types and classes, a poss-
ible outline for this security manual, and a possible shipboard
security organization which is simple and effective.
4 :::
2 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Or THIS PAGKCWb*" D»lm Enfrmd)
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Security Requirements and Organization
For Non-Tactical ADP Systems
On Small Surface Ships
by
Joseph E. Zavodny
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1978
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







This thesis investigates the problem of non-tactical ADP
system security requirements and security organizations on
small surface vessels of the US Navy. It presents an
overview of ADP security at the levels of the Federal
government, Department of Defense, and Department of the
Navy. The author researches the questions of whether there
is a need for an abbreviated security manual for
non-tactical ADP systems on small surface ships, the level
of detail required for such a manual, and the type of
security organization which might be required on a small
surface ship. Conclusions are drawn which present the need
for a security manual which pertains to specific ship types
and classes, a possible outline for this security manual,






II. OVERVIEW OF ADP SECURITY 14
A. DEFINITIONS 14
B. FORMS OF ADP SECURITY 15
C. ADP SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 17
D. ADP SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPT . OF
DEFENSE '. ... 20
E. SUMMARY 23
III. ADP SECURITY IN THE US NAVY 25
A. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 25
B. RISK MANAGEMENT 30
C. SECURITY TEST AND EVALUATION 35
D. CONTINGENCY PLANNING 36
E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 37
F. CONCLUSIONS 37
IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPBOARD ADP
SYSTEMS 38
A. INTRODUCTION 38
B. NON-TACTICAL ADP SYSTEMS IN SMALL SHIPS ... 39
C. THREATS TO NON-TACTICAL ADP SECURITY IN
THE SHIPBOARD ENVIRONMENT 40
D. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 48
V. NON-TACTICAL ADP SYSTEM SECURITY ORGANIZATION . . 53
A. PRESENT ADP SECURITY ORGANIZATION
REQUIREMENTS 53
B. RECOMMENDED NON-TACTICAL ADP SYSTEM
SECURITY ORGANIZATION 55
VI. CONCLUSIONS 59
LIST OF REFERENCES 62
BIBLIOGRAPHY 64
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 66
LIST OF TABLES
I FIPS PUBLICATIONS 18
I. INTRODUCTION
In this age of constantly expanding computer technology
there is often a tendency to "go with the flow" just to
maintain an even par with the new technology. As new
developments are presented and new machines are constructed,
it is often difficult to keep a proper perspective as to
what use these new computers will be put to, and how they
will be managed. But what happens after the right machine
is selected and matched to a corresponding "right" job?
Once the initial deficiencies are identified and corrected,
and the system is performing as expected, do the systems
managers amd operators sit back and relax, their jobs
completed? Not if they are good at their job and concerned
about the systems they are responsible for. A major problem
facing them now is that of system security. They must now
proceed with the security plans which were, hopefully,
designed during the initial phases of the systems'
development. The system must be protected from misuse,
abuse, sabotage, theft, and a whole plethora of other
security threats. This important issue is one which faces
the managers of all types of ADP systems in both the
civilian world and the military.
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The military aspect of ADP security is one that is
especially sensitive due to the nature of the military's
purpose. The military makes use of many different types of
computer systems which perform functions that range from the
control of guided missiles to the control of inventory and
personnel records. Basically, these ADP systems can be
divided into two separate categories; tactical and
non-tactical. Each category requires specific types of
security for system protection.
The US Navy has not let itself fall behind in the
business of ADP acquisition and use. It has developed or
acquired systems to fit its own particular needs in both the
tactical and non-tactical areas, though the tactical area is
far ahead of the non-tactical area as evidenced below. This
is due to the necessity of maintaining a modern and
effective arsenal. However, the Navy is currently beginning
to expend more money and effort in the area of non-tactical
ADP systems. According to LCDR Mark T. Brown, there is a
"computer gap" in the Navy which is "seen in the increasing
divergence of capability between its tactical and
non-tactical computer systems." [Ref. 1] He cites as an
example of this the emergence of LAMPS III into the fleet, a
highly technical new tactical system, while at the same time
the Navy is using a 20 year-old UNIVAC 1500 system, a
computer-card reading, batch-processing, non-tactical ADP
system, on large ships for non-tactical applications
[Ref. 1: p. 44]. Up to this time, the UNIVAC 1500 appeared
to be the only large-scale non-tactical ADP application in
the fleet. The SNAP I system (Shipboard Non-tactical ADP
Program) , the first part of a two-part program to modernize
and expand the non-tactical automatic data processing
capability of ships, was directed towards the replacement of
UNIVAC 1500 computer systems aboard large ships [Ref. 2].
The second part of the program being introduced into the
fleet at this time is the SNAP II system. It is currently
installed (or being installed) in some 90 surface ships,
with another 360 vessels slated to receive it in the future
[Ref. 3]. On the deep-draft (large) ships SNAP I will be an
update to already existing systems, but for the small ships
SNAP II will be a brand new automated system which will
replace the outdated manual systems.
There is a need at this point to differentiate between
the terms "large ship" and "small ship". A large ship is a
deep-draft vessel, i.e., aircraft carriers, replenishment
ships, amphibious ships, etc. Small ships are classified,
for the purpose of this research, as cruisers, destroyers,
frigates, mine countermeasures ships, research vessels, and
salvage ships. It is the large ships which have, in the
past, been the recipients of the non-tactical ADP systems
mentioned above. Small ships have been forced to do without
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any kind of automated system for non-tactical ADP
applications, save a system brought onboard by a resourceful
crewmember . Size is not the only differentiating factor.
Most large ships have an extensive command and control
capability, thus giving them another reason for having the
first shot at the initial installation of ADP equipment. In
this thesis, the author will focus on the group of vessels
classified as "small ships".
With the advent of SNAP II and other forms of
non-tactical ADP systems in the fleet, there is an urgent
need for some form of security program to protect these
systems. This need is most pronounced in the small ships
because they are new entries into the arena of automated
data processing. That, and the fact that the author's
professional background is in small surface ships, is the
basis for the area of research that this thesis will
encompass. Most instructions and directives in the
Department of the Navy (DON) have, up to this time, focused
primarily on the shore-based ADP system or the non-tactical
ADP system on large ships. It is the contention of the
author that there is a difference between the needs of a
large ship/shore-based ADP system and the needs of the SNAP
II-type system of a small ship in the areas of shipboard ADP
security organization and shipboard ADP security
requirements. The author also contends that there is a need
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for a separate security program which is suitable for small
ships which excludes all of the extraneous requirements
pertinent to large sytems
.
In the course of this thesis the author will attempt to
answer the following questions. First, is there a need for
an abbreviated ADP security manual for small ships? If so,
what level of detail is required, and what items will
determine that level? Second, for an afloat unit, what sort
of standard ADP security organization is required? Who
should perform what functions, and why? Finally, how can
these areas be addressed so that they can be of use to, and
be made available to the fleet?
In order to arrive at the point where these questions
can be answered, it is necessary to gain a basic
understanding of ADP security. The author will begin with a
basic overview of ADP security including its' theory,
application to the public sector and Department of Defense
(DOD) in general, and those requirements for security which
are imposed by the Federal government and specifically the
DOD. After an understanding of the basic tenets of ADP
security has been established, the author will present an
overview of current DON ADP security requirements and
regulations, concentrating on directives, instructions and
technology presently in effect. Once the foundations of ADP
security requirements currently in effect have been
12
presented, the author will present the unique requirements
for ADP security on small ships, followed by a discussion of
what type of security organization fits them best. Finally,
conclusions and recommendations will be offered.
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II . OVERVIEW OF ADP SECURITY
A. DEFINITIONS
In order to better understand the ADP security problems
facing a small ship it is necessary to first delineate
exactly what ADP security is, what it entails, what forms of
ADP security are currently available, and what basic
requirements are imposed by the Federal government and the
Department of Defense
.
First, what exactly is ADP security? A good definition
is found in FIPS Pub 102: "Computer security is the quality
exhibited by a computer system that embodies its protection
against internal failures, human errors, attacks, and
natural catastrophes that might cause improper disclosure,
modification, destruction, or denial of service." [Ref . 4]
This definition is followed by an amplifying statement that
the computer security of a system is a relative quality, not
an absolute state to be achieved, and that security applies
to both software and hardware. Another necessary definition
is that of a security requirement; an identified computer
security need [Ref. 4: p. 12]. The amplification statement
is far more complex than the definition itself, but it is
felt that it lends an expanded viewpoint to the definition:
Computer security needs are derived from governmental
policy, agency mission needs, and specific user needs.
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Governmental policy relating to computer security is
expressed in laws and regulations; agency security needs
are found in the agency's standards and policies; and
user security needs originate in the application
characteristics. Security requirements are expressed in
increasing detail as one progresses from high-level
general description of the system through lower levels
of detailed specification. Security requirements need
frequent review to insure their accuracy. [Ref . 4: p.
12]
B. FORMS OF ADP SECURITY
Now that the basic definitions of ADP security and
security requirements have been explained, the author will
present a brief overview of the different forms of ADP
security which are in use today. Many of these will not be
applicable to the requirements of a small ship, but they
will help to provide a background as to how the various
problems facing a small ship can be rectified.
The author has already established that, as automation
increases and the reliance on computer/ADP systems grows, it
becomes increasingly important to ensure that the
information entrusted to these systems is protected
[Ref. 5]. There are a large number of threats facing these
ADP systems. These threats include unauthorized access by
people to specific areas and equipment; ADP hardware
failures; failure of supporting utilities; natural
disasters; human errors; nonavailability of key personnel;
neighboring hazards; tampering with input, programs or data
15
files; and compromise of data through interception of
acoustical or electromagnetic emanations from ADP hardware
[Ref. 6]. Each threat has a specific way it can be
countered, from bomb-proofing to internal protection of the
programs
.
Physical protection of the ADP equipment is usually the
easiest to provide in for normal situations on land-based
facilities. The problem becomes greater in the shipboard
environment, as will be discussed in Chapter IV. In the
civilian commercial environment it appears that the focus is
on the techniques for information protection which range
from simple procedural controls to complicated controls
embedded within the hardware and software of the computer
system itself, as opposed to the physical protection of the
equipment [Ref. 5: p. 11].
Some examples of the internal security techniques in use
today include the security kernel concept, information
encryption (for communications security) , inference controls
for statistical data bases, a total distributed general
purpose computing system that can enforce a multilevel
security policy, and the development of technology for a
computer system that can be trusted to enforce security on
its own [Ref. 5: p. 11]. Of these techniques, the one of
most importance to the topic of ADP security on small ships
will be the security kernel concept, and it will be
16
discussed more fully in a later chapter. The other
techniques are geared towards larger, more complex systems
and are mentioned only as examples of what techniques are
currently available for use today.
C. ADP SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
As previously mentioned, there has been a proliferation
of computer usage in the past years by the Federal
government. This increased growth in usage has precipitated
an increased need for adequate security. To provide
guidelines and recommendations for these policies there are
a vast number of publications, bulletins and instructions
which have been issued on the subject of computer and ADP
security. The majority of these publications come from the
Department of Commerce's National Bureau of Standards and
are published as Federal Information Processing Publications
(FIPS Pubs). A sampling of those dealing with ADP security
are listed in Table I. Though not all-inclusive, this
listing gives a general idea as to the titles available, and
also to the number of regulations which can be applicable to
this subject.
For the Federal government, the general objectives of









1. FIPS Pub 31: "Guidelines for ADP Security and
Risk Management"
2. FIPS Pub 38: "Guidelines for Documentation of
Computer Programs and Automated Data Systems"
3. FIPS Pub 39: "Glossary for Computer Systems
Security"
4. FIPS Pub 41: "Computer Security Guidelines for
Implementing the Privacy Act of 1974"
5. FIPS Pub 65: "Guideline for Automated Data
Processing Risk Analysis"
6. FIPS Pub 73: "Guidelines for Security of
Computer Applications"
7. FIPS Pub 74: "Guidelines for Implementing and
Using the NBS Data Encryption Standard"
8. FIPS Pub 83: "Guideline on User Authentication
Techniques for Computer Network Access Control"
9. FIPS Pub 88: "Guidline on Integrity Assurance
and Control in Database Administration"
10. FIPS Pub 102: "Guideline for Computer Security
Certification and Accreditation"
4. protection against accidental/deliberate acts
[Ref. 7]
Dependent on the specific application of the ADP system is
the method used to meet the above objectives and any
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specific objectives unique to the application. To achieve
these objectives, basic controls are described. Selection
of the controls that are applicable and necessary for a
given application system depends both on its security objec-
tives and on the environment in which the system operates
.
Some controls are implemented by hardware, the operating
system or by the facility management [Ref. 7: p. 11]. These
basic controls are:
1. data validation




6. encryption [Ref. 7: pp. 11-23]
Though identification of the basic controls listed above may
appear simple, it is not. It is recommended that it be done
on a continous basis throughout the application system life
cycle, and changes made as necessary along the life cycle.
Three phases of the life cycle are mentioned in the govern-
ment publications; initiation, development, and operation
[Ref. 7: p. 23]. Outlined are procedures which are recom-
mended to be taken at each of these phases. These include:
security feasibility studies and initial risk assessment in
the initiation phase; security requirements definition,
designs for security inherent to the system, security
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programming practices, and test and evaluation of security
software in the development phase; and data control, employ-
ment practices, security training, security variance
responses, software modification, hardware maintenance, and
contingency planning in the operation phase [Ref. 7: pp.
23-43]. The publication goes into more specific detail than
is necessary for the purposes of this thesis at this time.
It is important to remember that though these procedures are
listed within various phases, security planning and mainti-
nance are ongoing occurrences, and steps must be planned in
order to correct variances or problems as they arise.
In addition to the guidelines related above, there is
also a security certification and accreditation program
called for by the Federal government. This is detailed in
FIPS Pub 102, and it carries further, the requirements
listed for basic security. These rules form the basis for
the regulations promulgated by all government agencies
.
D. ADP SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPT . OF DEFENSE
Given that some of the pertinent sources of rules,
regulations, and requirements for ADP security within the
framework of the Federal government have been identified, it
is now necessary to relate the posture of the Department of
Defense (DOD) on ADP security. Understandably, there is a
need for a higher degree of security awareness in the DOD as
opposed to the majority of the Federal government,
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specifically in the areas of national defense. Therefore,
it should follow that there is more emphasis placed on
computer security in the DOD
.
In order to determine the needs for computer security,
the DOD is continuously conducting tests, research studies,
and designing systems to alleviate the threats to its ADP
and computing equipment. In 1981 the DOD Computer Security
Evaluation Center (DODCSEC) was established to "complement
the established responsibilities of DOD components relating
to the overall policy, security evaluation, and approval of
computer systems ... . " [Ref. 8] This center was created
to aid in accomplishing the primary goal of the DOD with
regard to ADP security: to acquire a secure system,
one which will control, through use of specific security
features, access to information such that only properly
authorized individuals, or processes operating on their
behalf, will have access to read, write, create, or
delete information. [Ref. 9]
The main thrust of their work is to thwart the penetration
of the computer systems by the use of a Trusted Computer
System.
The Trusted Computer System (TCS) is a relatively new
idea. It is a system that employs sufficient hardware and
software integrity measures to allow its use for processing
sensitive information [Ref. 8: p. 57], and, in order for a
system to be trusted, the system must "reliably enforce a
21
specified policy for accessing the data it processes while
it accomplishes the functions for which it was built."
[Ref. 10] In building this type of system, the designer must
decide which security rules the system will enforce, and
then be able to assure that the system enforces them. The
principle recommendations to developers are that they
consider the security requirements of each system as a part
of its user-visible behavior, rather than as a separate set
of requirements; continue to think about security throughout
the design and implementation of the system; and use the
best available software engineering technology [Ref. 10: p.
86] .
The DODCSEC has developed criteria for evaluating the
hardware/software systems used in processing classified
information. The basis of this program is the Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) which is the protection mechanisms of a
system (hardware, firmware, and software) that are
responsible for enforcing a security policy [Ref. 10: p.
89]. In this criteria are four hierarchical divisions, with
D being the minimal, thru A for verified protection; and
each division is broken up into numbered classes. The
higher the class number, the greater the trust that can be
placed in the system. These divisions are intended to
represent major differences in the ability of the system to
meet security requirements, while the classes represent
22
incremental improvements [Ref. 10: p. 89]. These criteria
are at present generally being used in the requirements
phase of system development as a way of specifying security
requirements that correspond to the needs of a system, in
addition to their use in system evaluation.
The DOD is highly motivated in promoting the concept of
the Trusted Computer System, and is gearing much of its
computer research in that direction. There are a number of
projects underway to develop trusted systems, including
efforts to build trusted network interfaces [Ref. 10: p.
91].
Even though it appears that the Trusted Computer System
is the way of the future for DOD ADP security plans, there
are some opponents to this concept. The opposition is not
towards the basic idea of computer security, but towards the
path being investigated. It is noted that the vast majority
of computer-related crimes have been committed by personnel
who have authorized access to the resources they misused
[Ref. 9: p. 61]. The opponents do not have an alternative
plan to thwart this misuse by authorized users except to
limit access to the system.
E . SUMMARY
Up to this point, the basic ideas of ADP security,
Federal government ADP security sources and requirements,
and the requirements and postures of the Department of
23
Defense on ADP security have been shown. This information
is the foundation for the US Navy's requirements, goals, and
policies on ADP security.
24
III. ADP SECURITY IN THE US NAVY
In this chapter the author will present an overview of
the contents of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, DON Automatic Data
Processing Security Program, dated 3 August 1982. This
instruction forms the heart of ADP security in DON and an
understanding of its contents is necessary for all personnel
who have any contact with an ADP system. In order to
present a more concise appearance and to make it easier for
the reader to follow, all facts and references in this
chapter are from OPNAVINST 5239. 1A unless otherwise noted.
A. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
This instruction applies to all DON activities and
DON-related contractors, and is intended to serve as a
management tool which combines all necessary security
requirements from higher concerns , and promulgates them in a
simpler format. It covers the areas of policy,
responsibility and procedures for the establishment and
maintenance of ADP security programs, implementation
guidance, and assistance and direction in developing and
applying cost-effective security measures for the protection
of DON ADP systems and stored and processed data.
The objectives of the instruction are to:
1. Provide centralized guidance and uniform policy
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2. Provide a program which is responsive to the security
requirements and needs of ADP systems
3. Provide for operational reliability and asset
integrity
4. Provide realistic guidance and generalized procedures
to ensure that all data are adequately protected
against accidental or intentional destruction,
modification, and disclosure, and users are protected
against denial of service which may result from
events such as fraud, misuse, espionage, sabotage,
malicious acts, natural hazards, or fire.
In this instruction, various terms are used which may
not be familiar to the reader. An ADP system is an assembly
of computer equipment, facilities, personnel, software, and
procedures configured for the purpose of classifying,
sorting, calculating, computing, summarizing, storing, and
retrieving data and information with a minimum of human
intervention. There are three types of data levels
mentioned throughout the instruction. Level I is classified
data; Level II is unclassified data requiring special
protection; and Level III is all other unclassified data.
It is an established fact that ADP security is an
all-hands responsibility which encompasses the following
elements: physical, administrative/operating procedures,
personnel, communications, emanations, hardware, software,
26
and data. Due to the high importance placed on ADP
security, it is necessary that the program be carefully
managed, regularly reviewed, continuously monitored, and
routinely audited. For this to be accomplished, DON has
established a thirteen-point ADP security policy. In brief,
these points are:
1. A commanding officer and the ADP security staff will
take the necessary steps to provide an adequate level
of security for all ADP systems. They will implement
the mandatory procedures for risk assessment,
security test and evaluation (ST&E) , and contingency
planning.
2. Risk assessments will be an integral part of most ADP
security decisions.
3. Technical assistance for risk assessments, ST&E, or a
contingency test will be provided by Commander, Naval
Data Automation Command.
4. When a peripheral or remote device is to be connected
to an ADP system or network processing Level I or II
data and will be used by personnel of an activity
that is not responsible for the security of the host
system, the security of the peripheral is the
responsibility of the activity responsible for
security of the host ADP system or network.
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5. All DON ADP-related activities will comply with
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A
.
6. OPNAVINST C5510.93D contains guidance for the policy
on TEMPEST requirements
.
7. All ADP activities will meet accreditation
requirements as described below.
8. Activities processing Level I high security data are
subject to additional requirements from outside the
DON.
9. ADP security documentation disclosing vulnerabilities
or exploitation techniques will be marked "For
Official Use Only."
10. Software and files providing internal security
controls, passwords, or audit trails for ADP systems
will be safeguarded to prevent unauthorized
modification
.
11. Use of the Data Encryption Standard is prohibited for
ADP systems processing Level I data.
12. Many products available commercially are not
sanctioned for use by DON activities . Plans
implementing these technologies for Level I data
processing should include ascertaining if these
products are to be endorsed for DON use. Requests
for information should be forwarded to COMNAVDAC
.
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13. All ADP activities which process data covered under
other instructions will comply with the more
stringent requirements.
In addition to the above listed policies, each
commanding officer is responsible for the security of the
ADP system under his command and must meet additional
requirements which include development of an Activity ADP
Security Plan (AADPSP) , appointment of an ADP Security
Officer (ADPSO) , and ensure that proper care is taken to
ensure the security of his installation.
In the area of ADP security, an ADP activity or network
is either accredited or not accredited. Accreditation
describes the process whereby information pertaining to the
security of an ADP activity or network is collected,
analyzed, and submitted for approval to the appropriate
Designated Approving Activity (DAA) . After a review of this
material, the DAA will either concur, thereby indicating
that a satisfactory level of operational security is
present; or not concur, indicating that the level of risk
either has not been adequately defined or has not been
reduced to an acceptable level for operational requirements.
If not accredited, an activity may be issued an interim
authority to operate, contingent upon improved security
within a set periond of time. Accreditation
responsibilities differ for the various levels of data
(Levels I, II, III)
.
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Office Information Systems (OIS) are applications of
automated technology for document preparation, storage,
retrieval, manipulation, and distribution in an office
environment. Office Information System Equipment (OISE)
differs from ADP equipment, in that, OISE is primarily
limited to document text preparation and handling
applications, whereas ADP equipment is designed to process a
variety of applications developed using a general purpose
data processing language. There are specific security
requirements relative to an OIS. Due to the limited scope
of OIS applications, adequate security countermeasures can
be identified and implemented with less procedural effort
than would be required for a comparable ADP system. The
minimum security requirements for an OIS include;
operational reliability and asset integrity for prevention
of loss from natural hazards, fire, theft, and malicious
acts. The OIS is a system comparable to the non-tactical
ADP systems found on small ships (i.e., SNAP II), and will
be discussed in more detail in a later chapter.
B. RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management is the determination of how much
protection is required for an ADP system and how much
protection already exists. It is an ongoing effort, and
risk must be re-evaluated whenever changes occur to the ADP




1. Development of an Activity ADP Security Plan
2. Risk assesment
3. Countermeasure implementation and effectiveness
review.
The AADPSP implements the security policies set forth in
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A. It establishes local security policies,
defines security scope and objectives, assigns
responsibilities, sets short/long-range security goals, and
addresses security for all aspects of the local ADP
elements. It is an important document which must be
utilized for the management of the ADP security environment.
Risk assessment consists of two distinct parts; threat
and vulnerability identification, and countermeasure
identification. A threat is defined as any agent capable of
reducing the effectiveness of an ADP activity or network,
thereby degrading mission accomplishment. A vulnerability
is a weakness that may be exploited by a threat agent to
cause harm to the ADP activity or network. Countermeasure
identification is the process of determining the most
cost-effective method of countering a threat or
vulnerability.
There is a specific risk assessment strategy laid out in
the instruction. The first step is to conduct an ADP
Security Survey which will provide basic information about
the ADP security environment and help determine the scope of
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the risk assessment effort. Once this has been
accomplished, the DAA will determine the risk assessment
methodology to be used. There are two methods available,
and the complexity of the ADP environment is the determining
factor as to which one will be used. The environment
complexity is governed by the level of data processed,
security mode of operation, ADP system configurations and
locations, and the criticality of the mission. Method I is
the standard method for use in most ADP environments; Method
II is for use in less complex ADP environments. Method I
provides for greater detail than Method II, and Method II
does not provide for the interaction of threats and
evaluation of threats by impact areas. There are other
methods available, but permission must be obtained from CNO
for their use. The basic steps for both methods are:
1. Asset identification and valuation
2. Threat and vulnerability evaluation
3
.
Assessment of the frequency of successful attack
4. Computation of the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)
5. Selection af additional countermeasures based on
return on investment and reduction of the ALE.
Once the risk assessment has been completed,
countermeasures must be selected which will make the level
of risk acceptable. There are seven groupings of
countermeasures based on correcting weaknesses in the ADP
32
environment. Each method within the groupings is described
in terms of:
1. Vulnerability--description of the weakness that could
be exploited.
2. Countermeasure--description of an action, device,
procedure, technique, or other measure that reduces
the identified vulnerability.
3. Conf idence--a judgement as to the effectiveness of an
implemented countermeasure
.
4. Cost factor--qualitative statement on the anticipated
expense of implementing a proposed countermeasure.
The actual costs should be determined by consulting
the local procurement authorities
.
5. Caveats--limitations , unusual risks, dependencies,
and/or disadvantages related to the proposed
countermeasure
.
By groupings, listed below are the various countermeasure
techniques listed in OPNAVINST 5239. 1A. The instruction
states that the list is non-inclusive, but only contains the
most common techniques
.
1. Software countermeasures : security audit trails,
threat monitoring, residue control, log-on attempts,
unique password/authentication processes, password
protection from visual observation, file encryption,
data base protection, periodic inspections of hard-
ware, controlling use of assembler language coding,
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two-person control, periods processing, testing and
debugging, security editing and accounting, software
engineering tools, virtual machine monitors, password
file encryption, secure subsystems, and security
kernels
.
2. Hardware countermeasures : protection-state vari-
ables, memory protection mechanisms, front-end
machines, data base machines, tampering detection,
and interruption resistant power.
3. Administrative countermeasures: security officer
procedures, software development procedures, software
maintenance procedures, batch input/output proce-
dures, access procedures, waste procedures, emergency
procedures, and operating procedures.
4. Personnel countermeasures: personnel control and
compromise
.
5. Emanations: emanation security.
6. Physical countermeasures: access to the computer
center, physical layout, fire protection, environ-
mental control system, and building construction.
7. Communications countermeasures: communications lines
and links, terminal identification, handshaking,
telephone instruments, protected distribution system
and communications path alternatives
.
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The final step in the risk management program is
countermeasure implementation and effectiveness review.
This is done over a period of time. As the system changes
and new threats are perceived, new countermeasures may be
added as needed. The entire thrust of the preceding process
is to gain a security accreditation and provide the best
possible security for the system.
C. SECURITY TEST AND EVALUATION
Security Test and Evaluation is another part of the
accreditation process. The primary purpose is to obtain
technical information to support the DAA's decision to
accredit an ADP activity or network. It consists of two
interrelated phases. The first determines whether the
necessary countermeasures have been installed, and the
second determines whether the installed countermeasures are
working effectively.
The resources expended and the level of detail required
will depend upon the level of data being processed and the
mode of operation. The results of the risk assessment will
determine the level of detail and scope required. When the
Commanding Officer is the DAA, the ST & E are the
responsibility of the activity; otherwise it is performed by
COMNAVDAC . Qualified personnel at the activity will perform
the various steps of reviewing the risk assessment,




The Contingency Plan is an important part of an ADP
security program. DON activities dependent upon ADP to
support mission accomplishment are required to develop a
plan which would allow continuity of mission accomplishment
during abnormal operating conditions. The contingency plan
will consist of two distinct phases; the preparation phase
and the action phase. The scope of the plan will be such
that it identifies: actions required if the normal ADP
environment is impaired or disrupted; actions required if
the functional application or user is denied information or
service; and actions required if the ADP activity suddenly
had to expand processing capability to accommodate a
national emergency or some other critical event.
Preparation of the contingency plan entails an in-depth
look at emergency response, backup operations, recovery
expectations, and an assessment of the necessity for
emergency destruction of classified material. Once the plan
has been completed, it is to be tested annually, and
improvements made where necessary. No contingency plan is
required if unplanned disruption of services would not have
a critical impact on mission accomplishment; the DAA must be
informed if this is the case.
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E. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The remainder of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A is comprised of
various appendixes which offer a glossary of terms and
definitions, samples of ADP security training plans, threat
and vulnerability assessment worksheets, guidelines for ADP
security documentation, DON security and audit controls, and
mandatory minimum requirements for ADP activities including
environmental and physical security, communications




As can be seen, the DON ADP security program is an
extensive one which attempts to cover all aspects of the ADP
security environment. But is it too extensive, too
all-inclusive? Are there too many requirements and
regulations which are mandatory but cannot be adhered to by
the ADP organization of a small ship? These questions will
be explored in the remaining chapters
.
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IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPBOARD ADP SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters the author has discussed the
background of ADP security in terms of what it is, why it
exists, the aspects of security and how they are interpreted
by the Federal government, Department of Defense, and
Department of the Navy, and the various requirements imposed
on ADP systems by the agencies listed above. However, most
of those requirements were devised with large ADP systems in
mind. Because of this, and with the advent of non-tactical
ADP systems being installed on small surface ships, it has
been theorized that the current ADP security requirements in
effect may be too extensive for these smaller shipboard
systems. In this chapter the author will explore the unique
security requirements for non-tactical ADP systems on small
surface ships and some of the possible countermeasures
available to combat perceived threats. The author will also
address the subject of which sections of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A
have little or no relevence to non-tactical ADP security on




B. NON-TACTICAL ADP SYSTEMS IN SMALL SHIPS
Small surface ships are beginning to acquire
non-tactical ADP systems in the form of the SNAP II systems.
Prior to the installation of these systems onboard, most
small ships had to rely on the manual method of
accomplishing any data processing tasks. The objective of
SNAP II is to reduce the administrative burden on the fleet
by eliminating much of the manual paperwork requirements in
the forms of records and reports, and by reducing error
rates and associated time by screen-correcting documents
through on-line/immediate validation [Ref. 3: p. 20].
Presently there are four subsystems in SNAP II. They are:
1. System Management Subsystem (SMS). This performs
system management and system service tasks in support
of the other three subsystems
.
2. Maintenance Data Subsystem (MDS). This system will
support the ship's maintenance plan, including ship's
force work list, maintain maintenance logs and files,
automatically prepare OPNAV forms 4790/2K and
4790/CK, interface between maintenance and supply,
and allow maintenance completion with needed supply
items in a simpler manner than is presently being
done
.
3. Supply and Financial Management Subsystem (SFM)
.
This system automates current supply procedures
,
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including inventory control, OPTAR accounting, and
financial accounting.
4. Administrative Data Management Subsystem (ADM). This
will provide support for those functions specifically
related to shipboard administration. [Ref . 3: pp.
20-21]
As is readily apparent, SNAP II, when used properly,
will be a boon to the surface fleet. Once this system is
outfitted on board a small surface ship, what type of
security threats exist, and what sort of security protection
is required?
C. THREATS TO NON-TACTICAL ADP SECURITY IN THE SHIPBOARD
ENVIRONMENT
It is quite easily understood that the environment on a
naval vessel is fairly hostile to any type of system
installed on board. In this section the author will
identify those threats and vulnerabilities which relate to
the non-tactical ADP system in the shipboard environment.
This will not be an attempt to conduct a risk assessment,
but only to provide the information necessary to identify
the needs for ADP security, thus delineating shipboard
security requirements
.
Previously mentioned in Chapter II was a list of the
possible types of threats which face ADP systems. The first
of these threats was unauthorized access by people to
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specific areas and equipment. In the small ship environment
this threat is not very prevalent. Most work areas where
the non-tactical ADP system equipment would be used are
small, and access to them will be very limited. In
addition, when spaces on a vessel are not manned they are,
as a matter of routine, locked. This, in addition to the
possible use of an access list, would assist in deterring
unauthorized access to the system equipment. The major
threat in the way of unauthorized access would be the
possibility of somebody being able to log onto the system
without having the proper authorization allowing them to log
on. One way to prevent this unauthorized usage and prevent
tampering with input, programs, or data files is by the
implementation of the security kernel concept.
The security kernel is a technology which provides a
conceptual base on which to build a secure computer system
using a methodical design process [Ref. 11]. It is a system
beginning to see wide development in the commercial market.
An example of this form of application is Honeywell's SCOMP,
an implementation of a hardware/software general purpose
operating system based on the security kernel concept
[Ref. 12]. Though SCOMP is used in a large system, there
are also applications being developed for the use of the
security kernel in small systems. Research conducted at the
Naval Postgraduate School concentrated on the applications
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of the security kernel for a multiprocessor microcomputer
[Ref. 13]. It is this area of research which appears to be
the possible solution to the access threat posed in the
preceeding paragraph.
The security kernel approach is based on the concept of
the reference monitor, which provides an underlying security
theory for conceptualizing the idea of protection. In this
way all active entities make references to passive entities
using a set of current access authorization. The security
kernel consists of both hardware and software [Ref. 11: p.
14] . The purpose here is not to provide a detailed analysis
of the security kernel, but to give a brief outline so that
the concept can be understood and possibly applied to the
problem at hand. In order for the security kernel to be
properly developed, a specific security policy must be
delineated. There are two types of policies for this
system: nondiscretionary , which contains mandatory security
rules that are imposed on all users; and discretionary,
which contains security rules that can be specified at the
option of each user. Both policies are addressed by the
rules of the security model [Ref. 11: p. 15]. These
policies should be determined on a class-wide basis for
small surface ships, and possibly implemented as such.
In the security model, each subject and object of the
reference monitor is given a security identifier termed an
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access class, which are compared at each state transition to
determine whether a subject is allowed to access an object.
By proper organization of a mathematical structure called a
lattice, a wide range of policies can be supported [Ref. 11:
p. 16]. The final basic premises of this concept are the
two fundamental rules of the nondiscretionary policy; the
simple security condition, and the "star" property. The
simple security condition prohibits users from directly
viewing data they are not entitled to see, and the "star"
property helps to prevent all illicit indirect viewing of
objects [Ref. 11: p. 16]. On the negative side of the
security kernel is the fact that if applied to inappropriate
hardware, the security kernel can impose significant
performance burdens [Ref. 10: p. 94]. This problem can be
eradicated by simply chosing the correct hardware as needed
to ensure proper utilization of the kernel.
In the multiprocessor environment, the security kernel
provides the mechanism for support of the security policy of
the command. It is the author's belief that the proper
implementation of a security kernel will provide a great
deal of security for the system in the area of personnel
trying to gain unauthorized access to the system.
A second area of threat is that of ADP hardware failure.
This is very realistic in the small surface ship
environment. Because of the nature of a small surface ship,
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there are many outside agents which can contribute to the
failure of non-tactical ADP hardware. These include salt
contamination of components , intense movement of the
platform due to rough seas, and missile hazards, also due to
rough seas. In addition there is also the possibility of
failure due to a mechanical problem within the system
itself. The particular hazards encountered due to the ship
being at sea can be easily countered by standards being
established for the equipment to negate the pitch and roll
of the ship, much in the same way as current equipment
onboard is protected. Missile hazard damage is minimized by
a careful inspection of the space prior to going to sea.
This is a normal procedure on all ships prior to getting
underway. Salt contamination prevention is a function of
where the equipment is placed, and the adequacy of the
compartment 's water-tight integrity. In essence, the best
protection against hardware failure is to ensure that the
equipment is sturdy, and that the space housing it is
properly secured.
Failure of supporting utilities can be a major problem
on small surface ships, and it is not something that can be
easily controlled. Power failures and air-conditioning
losses are notorious common occurences on small surface
ships . Power failures range from complete loss to improper
voltage supplies. Electrical protection devices are
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necessary to prevent damage by a short-lived abrupt loss of
power and voltage fluctuations. Unfortuneately , there is no
real protection from a major power loss. Backup generators
for a non-tactical ADP system are not feasible due to space
and operational considerations. In fact, even tactical
abilities are lost during a major power loss because all
emergency power is shunted to the engineering plant (save
emergency lighting and power for a small radio) in order to
give the engineering personnel the ability to restore power.
A battery pack with a duration of not less than one hour was
recommended in order to protect memory during an unexpected
loss of power refprd 14 Loss of air-conditioning to a space,
necessary to keep the machinery cool, is another often-
encountered problem. The only real effective measures for
this type of problem would be to either minimize system
usage, or shut it down entirely. Air conditioning loss for
a short period of time will probably have little effect on
the system equipment due to it's low power usage.
There are a number of natural disasters which can pose
serious threats in the small surface ship environment.
These include fire, flooding, and hurricanes. Not only do
these pose a serious threat to the non-tactical ADP
equipment, but also to the safety of the ship itself.
Because of the consequences of fire and flooding to a small
surface ship at sea, there are well-planned procedures to
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combat either of the two when they occur. These procedures
usually concentrate more on relieving the threat quickly to
prevent it from spreading than to the actual protection of
the concerned equipment. This could have an adverse effect
on the non-tactical ADP system that might get caught in a
fire or flood, but unfortunately there are few other
alternatives
.
Human errors are basically a function of the amount of
training given an individual prior to allowing them to use
the system. Some of the possible errors can be quite
cataclysmic. For officer personnel, the proper use of the
SNAP II system is being incorporated into the curriculum at
the Surface Warfare Officer School Command (SWOSCOLCOM) in
the Basic Course, Department Head Course, PXO , and PCO
courses. The level of instruction in each curriculum is to
be geared towards the use of the system by the individual.
Current plans are to provide training which will encompass
all possible uses of the system [Ref. 3: p. 21]. Training of
this sort will not only reduce the possibility of human
errors, but will also allow the system to be used to its
full potential. At this time there is no equivalent course
for enlisted personnel. There are a number of viable
alternatives for training of enlisted personnel. When the
SNAP II system was first readied for introduction to the
fleet, it was recommended that training for enlisted
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personnel be conducted at organic training courses (PN, SK,
YN schools, 3M school, etc) for those who will be operating
the SNAP II system [Ref . 15] . Though being done on a
minimal scale, there is another alternative, that of
conducting the training at Fleet Training Centers. A major
drawback for this alternative would be the extra funds
required to implement the new courses. Funding is minimal
for the first alternative. The author would recommend that
training be continued in the source schools, but that some
other sort of short course be implemented at the Fleet
Training Centers for those not eligible for those schools.
The most devasting threat which faces the non-tactical
ADP system of a small surface ship is that of
battle-inflicted damage. Granted that this is the ultimate
which can occur, and it is not a threat to the security of
the system that can be easily defended against. But the
threat does exist, and must be addressed. Unfortunately,
the best defense is to not receive any battle damage.
Damage as a result of battle that can be inflicted to the
non-tactical ADP system is fire, flooding, or total
destruction. Countermeasures for fire and flooding are
already in ship's instructions, and there are no real
countermeasures for total destruction.
As the author has related in the preceeding paragraphs
,
there are a number of threats which face the non-tactical
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ADP system of a small surface ship, and some of them are
unique to only this type of environment. Some of the
threats have existing countermeasures which require little
or no modification, whereas other measures must be
implemented in their entirety. Now that the possible
threats which exist have been identified, it will be easier
to discuss the security requirements which are necessary for
the non-tactical ADP system of a small surface ship.
D. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The author, in Chapter II, defined a security
requirement as an identified computer security need. In
this chapter the threats which face the non-tactical ADP
system on a small surface ship have been discussed, along
with some possible countermeasures for these threats. In
this section the author will postulate what he believes to
be the necessary security requirements, in terms of the
security program in OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, for a small surface
ship.
Due to the uniqueness of small ships and the extent of
the security necessary for a non-tactical ADP system, it is
possible that the present security requirements in OPNAVINST
5239. 1A are far too extensive for these types of ships.
What is necessary is an instruction which contains the basic
requirements for security and allows specific information to
be added to it as appendices for the different classes of
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small surface ships, much on the same order as the format of
the COMNAVSURFLANT Master Training Plan. As an example, it
would be tailored for FFG-7 frigates by adding a FFG-7
appendix to the basic instruction. An instruction of this
type would be far easier to use, and would undoubtedly
provide a far more productive security plan.
There are some necessary sections which should be
included in this generic instruction. These sections will
follow the guide of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, but be pertinent to
small surface ships only. As in all Navy instructions, the
first section should define the scope of the non-tactical
ADP security program as it relates to small surface ships.
The second chapter should deal with the security
organization, both of the the DON and the ship, outlining
which officers are responsible for specific aspects of the
system's security. This section will be further discussed
in the course of Chapter V. Their duties and
responsibilities should be made stringently clear, and
easily understandable.
A section on accreditation is necessary also. For the
case of small surface ships, the final accreditation
authority should be the Type Commander (SURFLANT, SURFPAC)
.
The author believes that by having the authority for
accreditation at the Type Commander level it will enable
ships to receive aid far easier in case the ship is having
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problems meeting requirements. It is expected that there
will be only a limited amount of Level II data being used on
these non-tactical ADP systems, with the majority of the
information processed, being Level III. Because of this,
the accreditation problem becomes much simpler. Security
requirements for Level II data can be determined by the
Commanding Officer and ADPSO, with any strengthening of the
requirements left to the discretion of higher level commands
[Ref. 16]. By having the instruction promulgated at the
Type Commander level, specifically for small ships, it will
provide a more standard level of security, thereby making it
easier to enforce and maintain.
Requirements for accreditation should include a Method
II risk assessment, development of an AADPSP, development of
a contingency plan, and meet the minimum mandatory
requirements for environmental and physical security. It is
believed that the above requirements will be sufficient to
guarantee the security necessary for the system. The author
chose a Method II risk assessment because it is the proper
one for a less complex ADP environment, of which the
non-tactical ADP system is an example [Ref. 16: p. E-13].
Continuing with the theory of class-wide security
instructions, a risk assessment can be made easier than
would normally be expected. Since all ships of a class are
similar, it follows that the assets, threats,
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vulnerabilities and countermeasures would also be similar.
Generic risk assessment formats would be promulgated by the
Type Commanders and used by the individual commands who
would make necessary changes due to unique ship alterations,
etc. Contingency plans and security plans will be developed
in the same manner
.
Included in this instruction would also be requirements
for command review of the security program, to be conducted
at intervals in compliance with current directives, which
call for a review every three years or as necessary due to
changes in the non-tactical ADP environment [Ref. 16: p.
8-1] .
A training plan for non-tactical ADP security is a
necessary part of this instruction. Improper training of
personnel is as great a danger to the system as any other
threat. All personnel using the system should be required
to have adequate instruction prior to using the system. A
Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS) developed for users
would be an ideal method of training. As already stated,
officers are to receive training at SWOSCOLCOM. A shipboard
program should be outlined, and strictly enforced. The
areas of knowledge required by OPNAVINST 5239. 1A should be
adhered to in this program [Ref. 16: p. 10-2].
Appendix J of OPNAVINST 5239. 1A contains a listing of
mandatory minimum security requirements . The requirements
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listed for environmental and physical security are very
similar to requirements already enforced on small surface
ships. For the purposes of this new instruction they should
be tailored specifically for small surface ships so that
there are no discrepancies. Examples include the
requirement to keep all carpeted areas vacuumed frequently,
and a section of mandatory requirements for activities
processing Levels I and II data [Ref. 16: p. J-2]. These
conditions do not exist on small surface ships.
As can be seen, the outline presented above is an
alternative instruction to OPNAVINST 5239. 1A for a small
surface ship. This type of instruction would be much easier
for the shipboard ADP security manager to follow in
implementing a proper security program for his equipment.
By not having to wade through a great amount of material not
pertinent to his system, he will find that he has little
problem making the security program work. Another positive
outcome of this type of instruction would be a certain
uniformity throughout the Surface Warfare community in the
area of non-tactical ADP system security.
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V. NON-TACTICAL ADP SYSTEM SECURITY ORGANIZATION
The mere presence of a non-tactical ADP security program
does not guarantee that a system will be secure. There is
also a need for a security staff to oversee the program to
ensure its proper operation and maintenance. This chapter
will discuss the present requirements for an ADP security
organization, and the organization which the author believes
would be more suitable for the non-tactical ADP system of a
small surface ship.
A. PRESENT ADP SECURITY ORGANIZATION REQUIREMENTS
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A delineates a specific ADP security
organization for activities with ADP systems [Ref . 16: p.
2-5]. As in all Navy commands, the Commanding Officer has
full responsibility for the security of the systems under
him. He is responsible for ensuring the development of an
AADPSP, appointing an ADPSO/OISSO, and ensuring that all
other requirements of security are met.
Under the Commanding Officer, the ADP Security Staff is
headed by the ADP Security Officer (ADPSO) . He is
responsible to the Commanding Officer for ensuring that all
aspects of security are carried out. He must appoint the
Network Security Officer (NSO) if needed, coordinate ADP
security with the activity security manager, ensure that the
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AADPSP is developed and maintained, appoint an ADP System
Security Officer (ADPSSO) if needed, appoint a Terminal Area
Security Officer (TASO) if needed, implement the Risk
Management Program, carry out accreditation procedures,
ensure development of contingency plans, assist the ADP
security staff, ensure personnel security procedures are
established, conduct systems tests and evaluations, develop
a Risk Assessment Team Charter when required, and assume the
ADP security staff responsibilities for any staff member not
appointed. [Ref. 16: p. 2-9]
The Network Security Officer (NSO) is responsible for
developing the standard security procedures governing
network operations and ensuring that all required network
countermeasures are utilized [Ref. 16: p. 2-11]. The ADP
System Security Officer (ADPSSO) is appointed at the
discretion of the Commanding Officer for each ADP system
which processes or will process Level I or II data. This
officer performs much the same duties as the ADPSO, but for
his assigned systems. In addition, he must be the focal
point for all security matters for the ADP systems assigned,
execute the ADPSP, maintain an inventory of all ADP
hardware, implemented system software releases, monitor
system activity, maintain liason with remote facilities
served by the ADP system, conduct risk assessment, implement
appropriate countermeasures, and perform other tasks as
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indicated by the ADPSO [Ref. 16: p. 2-11]. The Terminal
Area Security Officer (TASO) is appointed for remote
facilities and enforces all security requirements
implemented by the ADPSSO for remote terminal areas and is
responsible for ensuring that proper countermeasures are in
place [Ref. 16: p. 2-12].
The final member of the ADP Security Staff is the Office
Information Systems Security Officer (OISSO) . As OISs are
considered a subset of an ADP system, the ADPSO is
responsible for the security of the OIS. However, at
activities which have only OISs, an OISSO will be appointed
in place of an ADPSO and will assume those duties of an
ADPSO which are applicable to OISs [Ref. 16: p. 4-1]. He
will maintain an inventory of the OIS, ensure that OIS
Security Operating Procedures are available, and be
responsible for instructing users as to knowledge of OIS
technology, OIS security, and OIS operations [Ref. 16: p.
4-4]
.
B. RECOMMENDED NON-TACTICAL ADP SYSTEM SECURITY
ORGANIZATION
As can be seen above, the structure and responsiblities
of the ADP Security Staff are complicated and immense. In
most large activities, there are enough personnel to handle
this additional workload. This is not the case on small
surface ships. The wardroom (officer's complement) of a
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small surface ship is small--usually no more than 30
officers on the largest ships--and most have primary
responsibilities which demand their full-time attention. In
addition, most are required to perform collateral duties
which take up their remaining time. No matter how important
ADP security is, the job of ADP security officer will fall
into this latter category.
The author believes that there is not a need for all of
the positions required by OPNAVINST 5239. 1A . First, there
are not enough personnel on board a small surface ship to
effectively man the positions adequately, and second, the
non-tactical ADP system is not extensive enough to warrant
it. The author suggests that the positions necessary to
facilitate an adequate security organization of a small
surface ship are the ADPSO and ADPSSO.
The ADPSO will perform those duties outlined in
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A, for his position, which are pertinent to
a small surface ship's non-tactical ADP system. He will
have overall responsibility for ensuring the security of the
system and will report directly to the Commanding Officer in
matters relating to security. The ADPSO position will be
filled by a department head with this position being a
collateral duty. The best possible choice would be the
Operations Officer because his primary job already entails
other points of security, and he would have less conflicts
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with the performance of his primary duties. The other
departments heads , engineer and weapons , have
responsibilities which do not allow the freedom that the
operations officer enjoys. The chief engineer very rarely
has time to get away from the engineering plant, and the
weapons officer is usually concerned with nuclear weapons
security, when applicable.
An ADPSSO is necessary to assist the ADPSO . No matter
how small the system the author is convinced that ADP
security is too important to leave to one person. The
ADPSSO will perform the duties of his position as outlined
in OPNAVINST 5239. 1A that are pertinent to small surface
ship systems. He will be responsible for the execution of
the ADP security program. This position is best filled,
again as a collateral duty, by a junior officer. It is
difficult to ascertain from which department this officer
should be, but it is definitely recommended that this duty
be this officer's primary collateral duty. As already
iterated, ADP security is the most important aspect of the
ADP system to the ADP security staff, and the ADPSSO must be
able to devote the necessary time to the proper performance
of his job.
The author sees no need for the designation of a TASO
,
NSO , or OISSO in the small surface ship situation. Their
duties as outlined, will fall within the purview of the
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ADPSO and ADPSSO. In addition, the size of the non-tactical
ADP system does not call for these extra personnel. If
there are too many members of the security organization, it
is quite possible that they will begin to work at
cross-purposes
.
There is a definite need for a training program to be
established for the ADPSO and ADPSSO to be completed prior
to assumption of their duties. It would be detrimental to
the security of the system, due to the intricacies of ADP
security, to place officers in those positions without the
proper training. The most likely choice for coordinator of
the training program would again be the Type Commanders,
once they have established the various security manuals for




In this thesis the author attempts to answer a number of
specific questions. First, is there a need for an
abbreviated ADP Security Manual for small surface ships, and
if so, what is the level of detail required, and what items
will determine that level? Second, what sort of ADP
security organization is required for a small surface ship,
who should perform what specific functions, and why? And
finally, how can these areas be addressed so that they can
be of use to, and be made available to the applicable
portions of the fleet? Based on the material presented in
the preceding chapters, the following conclusions can be
drawn.
There is a need for an abbreviated ADP security manual
for the non-tactical ADP systems of small surface ships.
OPNAVINST 5239. 1A is far too awkward and contains many
extraneous parts to be used in this particular environment.
It contains parts which do not pertain to the problems
discussed for small surface ships, and it can be very
confusing to try and elicit the sections pertaining to small
surface ship non-tactical ADP systems . The author has
provided a framework which is believed to fit the needs of a
small surface ship for non-tactical ADP security. Listed,
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are those sections deemed applicable, as well as sections
which should be added to make the manual more germane to
these ships. It is recommended that the task of producing
this manual be undertaken by the Surface Force Type
Commanders, who have already forseen the need for this type
of instruction, and that they should also oversee and
implement the program. The new manual should be written so
that it is applicable to all small surface ship types, with
specific appendices written for specific ship classes . This
is a necessary requirement due to the minor differences
which exist because of differing security threats. The
level of detail required for this manual is determined by
the complexity of the necessary requirements . The type of
threats to the systems employed are specific and vary by
small degrees between ship classes. It is the type of
threat which should determine this level of detail
.
The type of security organization required for a small
surface ship is smaller than that required for a large ADP
installation. The author recommends that an ADPSO and
ADPSSO be appointed to fill the requirements of this
organization. The ADPSO should be on the level of a
department head, preferably the Operations Officer. This is
due to his already close contact with various aspects of
security on the ship, and because the other department heads
are already too encumbered with other responsibilities. The
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ADPSSO will be the assistant to the ADPSO, and the position
should be filled by one of the junior officers. It is
imperative that these officers be given adequate training in
order to fulfill their responsibilities in a proper manner.
It has been noted that proper training as to the
operation of these systems is a key factor in maintaining
adequate security. The author recommends that, in addition
to the courses being offered at SWOSCOLCOM for Surface
Warfare Officers, additional courses be instituted at the
Fleet Training Centers and organic training schools to
instruct enlisted personnel in the proper use of shipboard
non-tactical ADP systems. There is a need to establish PQS
for these systems' users to ensure that proper training is
obtained.
ADP security is an integral and necessary part of the
ADP system. With the advent of new non-tactical ADP systems
on small surface ships, it is necessary to ensure that
proper steps be taken to guarantee that appropriate measures
are instituted for this type of security on the small ships.
The recommendations established in this thesis will provide
a foundation for what the author believes to be a usable
requirements manual and organization hierarchy.
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